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String theory has by now maintained a highly influential position in high energy 
physics for more than a quarter of a century. The present article analyses the 
reasons for the considerable trust exponents of string theory have in their theory 
even though it has neither found empirical confirmation nor a complete 
formulation up to this point. It is argued that this trust can be understood in terms 
of an emerging new conception of theory assessment that relies strongly on the 
identification of limitations to the underdetermination of scientific theory building. 
The second part of the paper makes the point that another conspicuous element of 
string theoretical reasoning, the prominent role of the notion of a final theory, can 
be understood in terms of this altered notion of theory assessment as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
1: Introduction 
 
When string theory was first proposed as a universal theory of all interactions in 1974, it was 
considered a highly speculative idea with very unclear chances of success. Today, three and a 
half decades later, the theory constitutes one of the most influential and most intensely 
analysed concepts in theoretical physics. String theory’s ascend has come along, however, 
with considerable changes of the characteristics of theory dynamics and theory assessment 
in fundamental physics. Those changes have, in recent years, provoked strong criticism of 
the string physical enterprise by physicists working in other research fields. In the present 
paper, we will discuss two controversial aspects of string physics and analyse their 
philosophical implications.  
The first point of controversy is directly related to string theory’s peculiar success story 
since the mid 1980s. Since then, the theory has attracted a large portion of theoretical high 
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energy physicists and exerts a strong influence on adjacent fields like particle physics model 
building and cosmology. The theory is widely treated as a well-established and well-trusted 
theory. While the degree of optimism regarding the theory’s prospects has had its ups and 
downs (after a very optimistic phase in the second half of the 1990s, the last decade has 
been characterised by a slightly more sober perspective), most string theorists would claim 
that string theory is likely to constitute an important step towards a deeper understanding 
of the external world.  
Many physicists in other fields have for a long time been irritated by the fact that string 
physics has acquired its remarkably strong position in high energy physics without having 
found empirical confirmation or even a complete theoretical formulation. The longer this 
situation prevailed, the more insisting the voices have become which call this a problematic 
development that threatens the integrity of the research process in fundamental physics. 
(for criticism in this direction, see e.g. [Smolin 2006], [Woit 2006] and [Penrose 2005].)  
A second worry for many observers is concerned with the final theory claim often 
expressed in the context of string physics. String theorists at times express their belief that a 
coherent formulation of string theory – which, to be sure, in many respects may be expected 
to look quite different from the present incomplete understanding of string physics - would 
constitute a final theory: no other more fundamental or more universal theory than string 
theory (or whatever the name given to the theory in then end) would ever be required to 
account for new empirical data. (Positions along that line have e.g. been expressed in 
[Weinberg 1994], [Greene 1999], or [Kaku 1997].) Critics consider such final theory claims 
misguided or even unscientific. One main strand of criticism which will be most relevant for 
our discussion asserts that final theory claims systematically lack a valid epistemic 
foundation.  
In the following, it will be argued that the two described controversial aspects of string 
physics are directly related to the same substantial shift in scientific reasoning that is 
happening in contemporary fundamental physics at this point: the increasing importance of 
assessments of scientific underdetermination. The disputes between critics and exponents 
of string physics in this light appear as disputes between defenders of the traditional 
paradigm of theory assessment and adherents of a newly emerging one. Understanding the 
character of that new paradigm will be the main purpose of this article.1 The article does not 
aim at vindicating the paradigm shift it purports. Any such vindication must in the end be 
based on the success of the scientific research program that is based on the new paradigm. 
Two more modest points will be made, however: the new paradigm will be shown to retain 
the characteristics of scientific reasoning necessary for critical theory assessment – and it 
will be argued that there are some good reasons for adopting and testing it at the present 
stage.  
 We begin our discussion by characterizing the alleged paradigm shift in Section 2. 
Sections 3 and 4 will then be devoted to discussing how that shift applies in the contexts of 
theory assessment and final theory claim respectively. Section 5 will synthesize those 
findings. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The reasons for using the paradigm concept in the present context will become clearer later on. It should be 
emphasised, though, that calling the string theorists’ perspective an emerging new paradigm does not per se 
prejudge that perspective’s validity. Paradigms may well emerge at some stage just to be found deficient a little 
later.  
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2: The Role of Scientific Underdetermination 
The classical paradigm of scientific theory assessment is based on one crucial principle: 
theory confirmation must rely on empirical data that reproduces predictions made by the 
theory in question. Scientific knowledge about the world consists of statements which have 
been empirically confirmed to a sufficient degree. Any substantial contribution to the 
extension of scientific knowledge about the world must be based on generating new 
empirically confirmed statements in one of two ways: either by generating new statements 
whose empirical implications match the existing data or by carrying out successful tests of so 
far unconfirmed theories.2 
 The described classical understanding of theory assessment emerged for good 
reasons. Empirical testing obviously plays a crucial role in distinguishing science from other 
forms of thinking about the world. The guiding role of empirical tests was essential for 
generating the impressive record of scientific success during recent centuries. Still, the 
strong focus put on empirical confirmation by the canonical understanding of scientific 
progress marginalizes an aspect of reasoning that arguably constitutes an important element 
of scientific thinking: the assessment of scientific underdetermination.  
 When a scientist develops a new theory in order to explain an observed 
phenomenon, her understanding of that theory’s chances of being viable (i.e. predictively 
successful in the future) will depend on a number of considerations which reach beyond the 
theory’s compatibility with the empirical data. For example, she might find the theory so 
simple and straightforward that she could not imagine it being false. She might be intrigued 
by the new theory’s beauty and assume that such high level of beauty cannot go entirely 
wrong. She might also notice that the new theory can explain a number of previously 
unrelated phenomena and take that as an indication of the theory’s viability. Finally, she 
might get the impression that there just is no other scientific solution to the problem 
addressed by her theory and infer that her theory is probably correct.  
Looking at the cited arguments more carefully, one finds that the last argument is 
implicitly deployed in all others as well. A theory’s simplicity, beauty or universality can only 
indicate its viability to an observer who assumes that no or very few alternative theories of 
comparable simplicity, beauty or universality can be fit to the available data.  Assessments as 
to how likely it is that no or few alternative theories can be fit to the available data thus lie 
at the root of all considerations regarding the prospective viability of a so far empirically 
unconfirmed or insufficiently confirmed theory. We want to call such assessments 
‘assessments of scientific underdetermination’.  
A few comments should be added in order to clarify the concept. First, it is important 
to note that conjecturing limitations to scientific underdetermination along the lines 
sketched above addresses a limited horizon of experimental testing. The scientist who 
resorts to this kind of reasoning wants to assess whether her theory can be hoped to get 
empirical confirmation of its core predictions within a certain experimental framework. 
Therefore, she is primarily interested in alternative theories which are empirically 
distinguishable at the next stages of empirical testing. Scientific underdetermination thus 
must address the expectations regarding the number of “bundles” of scientific theories 
which are compatible with the data Dt available at time t but are empirically distinguishable 
by a limited set E of future experiments which extend the tested regime along the directions 
                                                          
2
 Strict predictivists (see e.g. [Lakatos 1970]) have even insist that theory confirmation must be based on 
empirical data that has not entered the theory’s creation process. 
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suggested by the given scientific context. A bundle of theories here is taken to consist of 
theories which may not be empirically equivalent with respect to all possible data but are 
indistinguishable by the set E of upcoming experiments. Underdetermination is significantly 
limited if only one or few such distinguishable bundles of theories can be constructed. We 
want to call this kind of reasoning a local assessment of scientific underdetermination. A 
more far-reaching ‘global’ assessment of scientific underdetermination would ask for the 
number of theories which fit a given set of available data and can be distinguished by the set 
of all data that could possibly be collected. Given the limited range of applicability of 
conventional scientific theories, global limitations to scientific underdetermination usually 
don’t play a role in evaluating a theory’s predictive prospects. We will come back to the 
distinction between local and global underdetermination in Section 4. 
No observer of scientific praxis will deny that assessments of scientific 
underdetermination play a role in scientific reasoning. Scientists have opinions about the 
chances of success of new theories. In cases where they have already found many theories 
or models which are compatible with the given data but can be distinguished by upcoming 
experiments, they take each of those theories or models as a mere hypothetical example 
without good chances of being viable. In other contexts, scientists can be quite confident 
with regard to an empirically unconfirmed theory’s viability. Scientists thus clearly make 
judgments on scientific underdetermination based on an analysis of the theory in question 
and on the context within which it was developed.  
The canonical understanding of scientific progress, however, strictly distinguishes 
assessments of scientific underdetermination from the core elements of scientific progress, 
which are (1) the development of a scientific hypothesis and (2) the empirical testing of that 
hypothesis. The latter two steps are taken to generate scientific progress by creating new 
statements and establishing them as (probable) scientific knowledge. Assessments of 
scientific underdetermination, to the contrary, are taken to constitute mere instances of 
auxiliary reasoning that may be of some relevance by channeling scientific activity towards 
more promising investigations but do not directly contribute to the generation of scientific 
knowledge. Put in terms of the old conceptual dichotomy between context of discovery and 
context of justification, one may say that assessments of scientific underdetermination were 
always acknowledged as playing some role in the context of discovery but were denied any 
role in the context of justification.  
It may be fair to say in hindsight that this understanding was never entirely 
satisfactory. If assessments of scientific underdetermination were not capable of raising the 
probability of a theory’s viability, any reliance on them would be plainly irrational. Few, 
however, would want to assert that the scientists’ judgments along those lines are 
completely senseless. If assessments of underdetermination are capable of raising the 
probability for a theory’s viability, however, it seems difficult to deny that assessments of 
scientific underdetermination, if powerful enough, can amount to establishing (probable) 
scientific knowledge. A possible way out of this impasse is the understanding that 
assessments of underdetermination are not absolutely incapable of generating scientific 
knowledge but merely happened to be too weak for doing so up to now. Adopting that 
position regarding the scientific process up to the 1970s already brings us close to the claim 
that shall be made in the following. 
We want to argue that, whatever the judgment regarding earlier phases of physics, 
assessments of underdetermination have attained a status in contemporary fundamental 
physics that makes them a crucial element of the acquisition of scientific knowledge and 
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cannot be neglected any more in a meaningful analysis of the mechanisms of scientific 
progress. The two contexts analyzed in the upcoming chapters will support this claim. 
  
 
3: Trust in String Theory 
Since the 1970s, theory building in particle physics has generated theories whose 
empirical viability could neither be empirically established nor refuted for several decades. 
One prominent example is supersymmetry, which may find empirical confirmation at the 
current LHC experiments at CERN - about four decades after the first formulations of 
supersymmetric models were developed. Another important example is the development of 
grand unified theories (GUTs), which were first formulated in the 1970s as well, but whose 
characteristic energy scale lies many orders of magnitude beyond the grasp of collider 
experiments.3 
In some respects, string theory is even more detached from empirical confirmation than 
the aforementioned examples. Besides the remoteness of its expected characteristic scale, 
string theory faces an additional problem. Despite four decades of intense work, the theory 
has not even come close to being a complete theory. Though many of the theory’s aspects 
have been analysed, no full understanding of the theory’s structure has been reached or is in 
sight.  
Moreover, string theory’s predictive power is insufficiently understood on general 
grounds. The theory is presently believed to allow for a huge number of discrete local 
minima of the theory’s potential (estimates go up to numbers of 10500 or 101000), the so 
called string theory landscape [Susskind 2003]. Since the selection of a ground state is a 
quantum process, it cannot be predicted based on the fundamental theory’s structure; and 
since the characteristics of each groundstate translate into specific parameter values of low 
energy physics4 a huge number of local ground states suggests that a correspondingly huge 
number of low energy patterns of parameter values are physically possible. Moreover, the 
impossibility to scan so many groundstates ‘by hand’ implies that it would be very difficult to 
understand whether the universe we live in corresponds to a valid string theory ground state 
even if the theory’s fundamental structure was fully understood. In this light, it is difficult to 
assess how predictive string theory can be in principle. 
A gradual alleviation of the empirical as well as the theoretical deficits of string physics in 
the future seems possible. At the theoretical level, the pace of difficult but consistent 
progress of string theoretical analysis during the last decades leaves hope that a gradually 
increasing amount of predictive conclusions from string physics might be forthcoming in the 
long run. Empirically, some string theoretical models (see footnote 1) suggest that stringy 
signatures might even be found at the LHC. If the string scale turned out to be as high as 
traditionally assumed and therefore excluded empirical confirmation in collider experiments, 
the current improvements of cosmological precision measurements in conjunction with the 
                                                          
3
 GUT theories predict proton decay, which could be measured without approaching the GUT scale in collider 
experiments but has not been discovered up to this point. The simplest GUT scenario (minimal SU(5)) is ruled 
out due to the lack of observed proton decay while in other scenarios the level of proton decay can be small 
enough for being compatible with the available empirical data. Proton decay can have other reasons than 
grand unification, which is why a conclusive confirmation of grand unification would be difficult to attain 
without measuring signatures of GUT-gauge bosons. The latter, however, must be expected to lie beyond the 
reach of any imaginable collider experiment.      
4
 The term ‘low energy physics’ denotes physics that is testable at the current LHC experiment at CERN.  
6 
 
increasing interdependence between string theory and cosmology still could allow a certain 
level of empirical access to string theoretical predictions on that basis in upcoming years. 
Thus, one may hope that the connection between theory and experiment in string physics 
won’t remain as inaccessible as it is today. There is no reason to expect, however, that string 
theory will either be fully understood theoretically or find conclusive empirical confirmation 
in the foreseeable future. 
 The highly influential position string theory has acquired since the mid 1980s stands in 
remarkable contrast to its theoretical incompleteness and its precarious empirical status. As 
already mentioned in the introduction, this high self confidence has in recent years led to 
criticism by a number of physicists who work in other fields or on other research programs.  
 We want to argue that the dispute on the status of string theory is in fact based on 
diverging understandings of the role of assessments of scientific underdetermination in 
science.5 While the critics of string theory stick to the traditional understanding that 
assessments of scientific underdetermination cannot generate scientific knowledge, string 
theorists have been led by their scientific activity towards a perspective that acknowledges 
judgments based on assessments of underdetermination as legitimate means of establishing 
a scientific theory. This does not mean that the importance of empirical testing is denied. 
The new paradigm adheres to the understanding that conclusive empirical evidence which 
supports a theory’s core predictions constitutes the strongest form of theory confirmation, 
trumps all other strategies of theory evaluation and therefore must be aimed at throughout 
the scientific process. The emerging new paradigm moves away from an understanding, 
however, that attributes the status of mere hypotheses to scientific theories which have 
found no empirical confirmation.  
 Of course, the drought of empirical evidence plays an important role in the described 
paradigm shift. It is crucial to understand, however, that it is not the only reason, arguably 
not even the most important one, for its occurrence. The main factor in the new paradigm’s 
emergence is constituted by the fact that string theory itself as well as the context and 
dynamics of its evolution provide a workable and plausible basis for assessments of scientific 
underdetermination.  
Three contextual arguments to that end will be discussed in the following. We will 
present a coherent reconstruction of strategies of reasoning which largely constitute 
informal background arguments that support the trust in string theory but tend not to be 
laid out explicitly in scientific works. Therefore, it is not easy to find classical formulations in 
the literature. All arguments to be discussed can be identified in a more or less explicit form 
in Polchinski’s classical textbook [Polchinski 1998], however. It should be noted that the 
described arguments are by no means new inventions of string physics. They have played a 
role at earlier stages of the physical evolution but were largely ignored in the canonical 
understanding of theory assessment. This was possible for two reasons. First, empirical 
testing was available at that time and second, the arguments deployed were somewhat 
weaker than in contemporary fundamental physics. The changing circumstances from the 
1980s onwards, however, render those arguments more conspicuous and increasingly 
difficult to ignore. 
 Only the first argument explicitly expresses an assessment of scientific 
underdetermination. However, a closer analysis of the other two arguments reveals their 
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 A more detailed analysis of the claim that criticism of string physics is due to a paradigmatic shift is given in 
[Dawid 2009]. 
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reliance on limitations to underdetermination as well. The three arguments are 
interdependent and have to be combined to generate a powerful overall statement.6 
 (1) The argument of no alternatives: This argument constitutes an assessment of 
limitations to scientific underdetermination in a fairly straightforward way. String theorists 
tend to believe that their theory is the only viable option for constructing a unified theory of 
elementary particle interactions and gravity. It is important to understand the scope and the 
limits of that claim. String theory is not the only theory dealing with questions of quantum 
gravity. Various approaches to canonical quantum gravity try to reconcile gravitation with 
the elementary principles of quantum mechanics. The currently most popular among those 
approaches may be Loop quantum gravity [Rovelli & Smolin, 1990]. Those approaches (as 
well as some other, non-standard, approaches to a reconciliation of quantum physics and 
gravity) discuss the question of unification at an entirely different level than string theory, 
however. The latter stands in the tradition of the standard model of particle physics and is 
based on pivotal concepts such as non-abelian gauge theory, spontaneous symmetry 
breaking, and renormalizability. String theory’s goal is to reconcile gravity with these 
advanced and successful concepts of contemporary particle physics and therefore to provide 
a truly unified description of all natural forces. At the present stage, the investigations in 
canonical quantum gravity, do not constitute alternatives at this level, which leaves string 
theory as the only available candidate theory.7  
 Specific support for the argument of no alternatives can be found at a number of 
levels. First, alternative attempts to achieve a consistent unification of nuclear interactions 
and gravitation have been tested quite extensively in the 1970s and 1980s in the context of 
supergravity theories. Today it is understood that supergravity cannot provide a satisfactory 
solution to the problems of non-renormalizability that arises in field theoretical attempts to 
carry out such unification. It can, however, be understood as an effective theory (a good 
approximation at lower energies) of string theory. Second, analysis within the framework of 
string physics could have but has not led to the emergence of alternative theories. Third, 
there are vague arguments that even attempts to sacrifice very basic physical principles in 
order to find alternative scenarios to string theory would, if made coherent, lead back 
towards the string theoretical approach (see e.g. [Polchinski 1999]).  
 The observation that the physics community cannot think of a viable alternative to 
string theory does not in itself imply that there are in fact no or few alternatives. It might just 
as well be an indicator of the limits of human intellect, creativity or scientific diligence. 
Moreover, candidates for alternatives do appear at times and thus pose a constant threat to 
simple arguments of no alternatives.8 In order to establish that the lack of alternatives found 
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 An analysis of these arguments has been given in [Dawid 2007]. Bayesian formalizations of Arguments 1 and 2 
are presented in [Dawid & Hartmann, 2011a and 2011b].  
7
 That is not to deny the relevance of investigations in canonical quantum gravity. Many string theorists would 
just guess that, to the extent canonical quantum gravity finds physically viable solutions, those solutions will 
blend into the string theory research program once they are put into the context of contemporary high energy 
physics. No-one can exclude, of course, that ideas from canonical quantum gravity one day will develop into a 
full-fledged alternative theory of all interactions. If such an alternative theory was found, it would open up far-
reaching new perspectives. If not, serious attempts to find it would have been significant nevertheless as 
contributions to the strengthening of the no alternatives argument.  
8
 A recent example for an interesting new perspective is [Horava 2009], which proposes a scenario that solves 
the renormalizability problem of quantum gravity in a different way. It presents a theory that is non-relativistic 
at very short distances but approximates relativistic physics at longer distances. If consistent, such a scenario 
would constitute an alternative to string theory as a possible solution to the renormalizability problem of 
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so far does constitute a significant indication of a scarcity of possible options, it is necessary 
to consider arguments beyond the argument of no alternatives itself.  
(2) The argument of unexpected explanatory interconnections closely resembles a 
well known principle of empirical theory confirmation. It is widely held that a truly 
convincing confirmation of a scientific theory must be based on those of the theory’s 
achievements which had not been foreseen at the time of its construction. Normally, this 
refers to phenomenological predictions which are later confirmed by experiment. However, 
there is an alternative. Sometimes, the introduction of a new theoretical principle 
surprisingly provides a more coherent theoretical picture after the principle’s theoretical 
implications have been more fully understood. This kind of theoretical corroboration plays 
an important role in the case of string theory. Once the basic postulate of string physics had 
been stated, a series of unexpected deeper explanations of seemingly unconnected facts or 
theoretical concepts emerged. Two strong examples for this development are the 
interpretation of black hole entropy and the connections to supersymmetry and 
supergravity.  
Initially, interest in supersymmetry was motivated primarily by the abstract 
mathematical question whether any generalisation of the classical symmetry groups was 
possible. As it turns out, supersymmetry is the maximal consistent solution in this respect. 
Soon after the construction of the first supersymmetric toy-model, it became clear that a 
formulation of supersymmetry as a gauge-symmetry (=local supersymmetry or supergravity) 
had the potential to provide a fuller understanding of the particle character of gravity. In the 
context of string theory, on the other hand, it had been realised early on that a string theory 
that involves fermions must necessarily be locally supersymmetric.9 The question of the 
maximal symmetry group, the quest to integrate the graviton naturally into the field 
theoretical particle structure, and the attempts to formulate a consistent theory of extended 
elementary objects thus miraculously blend into one coherent whole. 
A problem that arises when general relativity goes quantum is black hole entropy. 
The necessity to attribute an entropy proportional to the area of its event horizon to the 
black hole in order to preserve the global viability of the laws of thermodynamics was 
already understood in the 1970s. The area law of black hole entropy was merely an ad hoc 
posit, however, lacking any deeper structural understanding. In the 1990s it turned out that 
some special cases of supersymmetric black holes allow for a string theoretical description 
where the black hole entropy can be understood in terms of the number of degrees of 
freedom of the string theoretical system [Strominger & Vafa 1996]. Thus, string physics 
provides a micro-physical understanding of black hole entropy. 
  All of these explanations represent the extendedness of particles as a feature that 
seems intricately linked with the phenomenon of gravity and much more adequate than the 
idea of point-particles for a coherent overall understanding of the interface between gravity 
and microscopic interactions. The subtle coherence of the implications of the extendedness 
of elementary objects could not have been foreseen at the time when the principle was first 
suggested. It would look like a miracle if all these instances of delicate coherence arose in 
the context of a principle that was entirely misguided.  
 The argument of unexpected explanatory interconnections can be read as an 
argument against a high degree of scientific underdetermination. If many solutions to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
quantum gravity. The debate on the scenario’s consistency, its promises and its limitations is ongoing at this 
point.  
9
 World sheet supersymmetry of a string that includes fermions was discovered by [Gervais & Sarita 1971]. A 
string theory that shows local target space supersymmetry was finally formulated by [Green & Schwarz 1984]. 
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problem of providing a finite or renormalizable theory of quantum gravity existed, there 
would be no reason to expect that most of them provide the unexpected explanatory 
interconnections provided by string physics. If only one solution existed, on the other hand, 
that solution must provide these explanatory interconnections because a fully valid theory of 
quantum gravity must account for all aspects of the phenomena involved. Observing these 
interconnections thus may be taken as an indicator that only one or few solutions exist. 
 While the argument of unexpected interconnections thus can support an argument 
of no alternatives, it cannot be conclusive. It may still be the case that, for some 
unappreciated deep structural reason, all solutions to one problem have to be solutions to a 
set of other problems as well. A structural reason of that kind would explain unexpected 
explanatory interconnections. It would not exclude, though, that a very large number of 
theories on that basis can explain the available data. Therefore, the argument of unexpected 
internal coherence on its own does not strictly imply limitations to scientific 
underdetermination.  
 Based on arguments 1 and 2, we can draw the following preliminary conclusion. The 
two arguments seem to present a coherent case for limitiations of scientific 
underdetermination, which, if true would translate into good chances that string theory is 
viable. However, an alternative interpretation is possible. If the lack of known alternatives is 
due to the scientists’ limited capabilities and the unexpected explanatory interconnections 
are due to some deeper structural reasons which do not enforce a specific theory, 
arguments 1 and 2 do not work as reliable indicators for string theory’s viability. In order to 
understand how likely this alternative interpretation is, we have to resort to a third 
argument, which connects our line of reasoning to empirical data. 
(3) The meta-inductive inference from other cases of predictive success. In string 
theory, this argument strongly relies on the example of the standard model of particle 
physics [Weinberg 1967]. The standard model was developed in the 1960s and early 1970s in 
order to provide a coherent description of electromagnetic and weak interaction processes 
that could account for the observed fermionic masses. In the early 1970s, it turned out that 
the concept of non-abelian gauge field theory deployed in the standard model was a 
promising tool also for describing strong interaction: the properties of confinement and 
asymptotic freedom observed in the context of strong interactions could be shown to be 
directly implied by unbroken non-abelian gauge field theory. The resulting application of 
non-abelian gauge theory to all nuclear interactions resulted in the full formulation of the 
standard model as we know it today. Initially, the use of non-abelian gauge field theories 
was largely motivated by the aim to solve a serious consistency problem of particle physics: 
the non-renormalizable character of simpler models of weak interaction. Starting from 
there, gauge field theory turned out to provide a good solution to the problems of 
confinement and asymptotic freedom in strong interactions (thus providing a good example 
of unexpected explanatory interconnections). After the renormalizability of non-abelian 
gauge theory had been proved in the early 1970s [‘t Hooft & Veltman 1972], the standard 
model was the only known satisfactory theory of all nuclear interactions (thereby providing 
the basis for an argument of no alternatives).  
The standard model was based on the conjecture of a new class of non-abelian gauge 
vector fields which had not been empirically confirmed at the time of the theory’s 
construction. Furthermore, it predicted a wide spectrum of so far unconfirmed fermionic 
particles and symmetries of the interaction structure.  In the two decades until 1994, all 
those predictions except for one (the Higgs particle that is presently searched for at the LHC 
experiments in Geneva) got empirically confirmed. The standard model of particle physics 
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today thus constitutes a strong example of a theory that (i) did not have any equally 
satisfactory alternatives before its core characteristics had been empirically confirmed, (ii) 
revealed significant unexpected explanatory interconnections after its construction and (iii) 
indeed turned out to be empirically viable at the end. Given its eventual empirical success, 
the arguments of no alternatives and of unexpected explanatory interconnections appear as 
reliable indicators of the theory’s viability. 
The case of the standard model fits into a wider pattern. There are a number of 
striking cases in 20th century physics where an explanatory powerful theoretical solution for 
a crucial consistency problem seemed without equivalent alternatives and eventually turned 
out to be predictively successful. In microphysics, one may cite the successful prediction of 
anti-matter based on Dirac’s formulation of relativistic quantum theory and subsequent 
correct quantitative predictions in the framework of quantum electrodynamics. In 
gravitational physics, the most striking example would be the successful prediction of light 
bending by Einstein’s general theory of relativity. On the other hand, there seem to be few if 
any recent examples in fundamental physics where conditions (i) and/or (ii) from above 
were clearly fulfilled but the corresponding theory turned out predictively unsuccessful 
when empirically tested. This wider framework may suggest that arguments (1) and (2) can 
serve as reliable indicators for a theory’s viability in the context of fundamental physics. 
The argument becomes more cogent when expressed in terms of scientific 
underdetermination. Like arguments (1) and (2), the standard model’s predictive success 
indicates limitations to scientific underdetermination: if large numbers of alternative 
theories with different empirical predictions existed, physicists could have found many 
theoretical solutions which differed from the standard model and were empirically 
inadequate. It would then seem miraculous that the predictively successful theory and none 
of its alternatives was found by the scientists in the 1960s. The assumption of a very small 
number of possible solutions, to the contrary, can explain why the scientists found an 
empirically successful solution.  
We thus have a plausible understanding why (iii) predictive success tends to occur in 
conjunction with (i) a scarcity of known alternatives and (ii) unexpected explanatory 
interconnections: all three phenomena are natural consequences of limitations to scientific 
underdetermination. If we observe that, within our research field, (i) and (ii) indeed tend to 
occur in conjunction with (iii) whenever sufficient empirical testing has been carried out, this 
justifies the conclusion that we work within a research field where possible alternative 
reasons for (i) and (ii) (which have been mentioned at the end of the discussion of argument 
(2) ) tend not to apply: scientists tend to be capable enough for finding alternative theories if 
such alternatives abound, and unexpected explanatory interconnections tend not to arise 
due to deep structural reasons which allow for many alternative theoretical realizations. It 
therefore seems reasonable to carry out a meta-inductive inference from the predictive 
success of theories like the standard model to the probable viability of other so far 
empirically unconfirmed theories where, just like in the standard model case, (i) and (ii) are 
realized.  
Note that argument (3), just like arguments (1) and (2), would not be convincing on 
its own. Looking at argument (3) alone, it would seem unclear whether the predictive 
success of theories like the standard model or general relativity can be relevant for an 
assessment of the viability of string theory. After all, the latter looks quite different from the 
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former theories in a number of respects10. One has to look at arguments (1) and (2) in order 
to understand in which respects all theories under consideration are similar and why that 
similarity is important when addressing the question of a theory’s viability. Only the 
conjunction of all three non-empirical arguments of theory assessment therefore can instil 
substantial trust in the viability of string theory even in the absence of empirical 
confirmation.   
 
 
4: The Final Theory Claim 
 
String theorists tend to assume that a coherent formulation of string theory would 
constitute a final theory: no other more fundamental or more universal theory than string 
theory would ever be required to account for new empirical data. This form of a final theory 
claim is a little weaker than some final theory claims discussed elsewhere in the literature. 
First, it is confined to physics and does not address the question of a unified description of 
physics and mentality (which is at the core of the analysis in [Chalmers 1996]). Moreover, its 
empirical focus makes it weaker than final theory concepts which are based on the notion of 
ultimate explanation (see [Rescher 2006]).11  
The role played by final theory claims in string physics is reminiscent of the role played 
by non-empirical assessments of the theory’s viability. Final theory claims clearly contribute 
to the fascination of string theory and arguably constitute a significant element of the overall 
mindset behind string physics. However, they seem to lie a little beyond the concerns of 
down to earth science, which is why their analysis mostly remains at an informal level and is 
more conspicuous in private communication and in publications aimed at a wider public than 
in scientific publications. The final theory claim was most famously discussed in Stephen 
Weinberg’s book “Dreams of a Final Theory” [Weinberg 1994], it is addressed in [Greene 
1999] and in [Kaku 1997] and has been emphasised at several instances by S. Hawking (see 
e.g. [Hawking & Mlodinov 2010]).  
String theorists have two main reasons for adopting the belief that string theory might 
be a final theory. First, string theory unifies nuclear interactions and gravity and therefore, if 
valid, would cover all physical interactions known today. If full universality is taken as a goal 
of physical theory building, string theory thus looks like a candidate for a theory that has 
achieved this goal and therefore may be taken to terminate the sequence of theories moving 
in that direction. Second, theory succession in fundamental microphysics throughout the 
20th century has been driven by moving towards testing smaller and smaller distance scales. 
String theory turns out to predict that its own characteristic scale, the string length, 
constitutes a fundamental minimal distance scale. In a string theoretical context, all 
information that might be framed as information on smaller distance scales than the string 
length is redundant and can be expressed also in terms of information on scales higher than 
the string scale. The crucial theoretical concept behind this statement is T-duality, which 
roughly provides a transformation that translates all statements about distance scales R into 
                                                          
10
 Though being developed as an attempt to solve a consistency problem just like string theory, the standard 
model obviously was much closer to empirical data as string theory and immediately generated very specific 
empirical predictions. General relativity, whose development was more similar to the one of string theory in 
being motivated by very general reasoning without close interaction with empirical data, was developed within 
a significantly different conceptual framework. 
11
 The conceptual problems identified by Rescher with respect to his definition of a final theory claim thus do 
not arise in our case. 
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empirically equivalent statements about distance scales α2/R (where α is the string length). 
(For a discussion of T-duality’ implications for a minimal length scale, see [Witten  1996]  
Critics of string theory often consider final theory claims unscientific. The general 
sentiment behind critical remarks published in some books and articles (see e.g. [Dyson 
2008]), is arguably shared by many physicists and philosophers of science. The most 
straightforward arguments against final theory claims work at an epistemic level: even if one 
granted the theoretical possibility of a final theory, it seems that no sound epistemic basis 
can justify attributing that status to any specific theory. Regarding the universality argument, 
the following problem arises. Statements on a theory’s full universality can only be made 
with respect to the set of phenomena known at the time. Such statements do not imply, 
however, that new phenomena which reach beyond the allegedly universal theory cannot be 
discovered in the future. Equally, the duality argument for string theory’s final character can 
be criticized on general grounds. Whatever reasons a theory might offer for being seen as a 
final theory, those reasons must always be based on the theory itself. Thus, they can never 
constitute conclusive arguments against the possibility that an altogether different theory 
could supersede the present one and render the theory-dependent final theory claim 
obsolete. Any final theory claim in this light seems to be based on an unfounded denial of 
the historicity of scientific reasoning.  
 In the following, we will argue that the rising importance of assessments of scientific 
underdetermination devaluates the epistemic arguments against final theory claims and 
thus gives new credence to the latter. In fact, both stated arguments against final theory 
claims are based on the canonical paradigm of theory assessment according to which a 
theory’s status can only be assessed to the extent it has been tested by empirical data. Since 
the available data will never exhaust the data that could be collected in principle, 
judgements regarding the status of scientific theories can never address the question of 
finality.   
 It has already been argued in the previous section that the canonical paradigm of 
theory assessment does not square with the actual research process in contemporary high 
energy physics. Assessments of limitations to scientific underdetermination reach beyond 
the horizon set by currently available empirical data. Can those assessments be extended 
towards a strengthening of final theory claims? 
To answer this question, we first have to understand that the case of final theory 
claims differs substantially from the case of non-empirical theory assessment discussed in 
Section 3. Section 3 has established the existence of rational arguments for what we have 
called ‘local’ limitations to scientific underdetermination. A scarcity of alternatives was 
argued for with respect to bundles of theories which give distinguishable predictions 
regarding some limited set of future experiments. A final theory claim, to the contrary, must 
be based on an assessment of ‘global’ limitations to underdetermination, that is, limitations 
to the number of theories which are empirically distinguishable based on all possible 
observations. If we want to use the arguments presented in Section 3 for supporting final 
theory claims, we therefore have to establish that, under appropriate circumstances, 
assessments of local limitations to scientific underdetermination can support the case for 
global limitations as well.  
Usually, local limitations to underdetermination can be established without implying 
any global limitations. In special sciences, this fact arises as a consequence of what one could 
call the vertical hierarchy among scientific theories. A clear distinction can be drawn 
between the characteristic length scale of some phenomenon to be explained by a theory in 
a special science and smaller length scales that characterise more fundamental scientific 
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theories on which the theory in question is implicitly based. Thus, even if only few 
mechanisms can explain the available data and provide distinguishable predictions for future 
experiments at one level of description (which means that local underdetermination is 
limited at this level), many different realisations of those mechanisms may be possible at the 
micro-levels addressed by more fundamental theories.  
To give an example, any modern biological theory about the evolutionary 
mechanisms that led to the development of wings is implicitly based on the understanding - 
drawn from substantially different fields of scientific research - that animal wings consist of 
atoms which, in turn, are built of more fundamental elementary particles. Evolutionary 
biologists now may argue for the viability of an individual theory about the evolutionary 
development of wings in a specified context by pointing out that the theory in question 
seems to be the only theory that can account for all known empirical evidence relevant in 
the given context. (That is, they deploy a claim of local limitations to scientific 
underdetermination.) This does not imply, however, that only one kind of microphysical 
realisation or only one set of bio-chemical or physical laws could underlie the conjectured 
macroscopic evolutionary mechanism. Which microphysical realization actually applies is not 
subject of the initial investigation and has to be established through experiments at entirely 
different energy scales carried out in biochemistry and microphysics. Local limitations to 
scientific underdetermination thus do not translate into global ones in the given case.  
In fundamental physics, the distinction between local and global underdetermination 
works in a similar way as in the special sciences. The role played by the hierarchy of theories 
in the special sciences is now taken over by the limited range of viability of individual 
theories within a more universal general conception of physical phenomena.  We may know 
about a theory B which constitutes an alternative to a theory A but which is characterized by 
a certain parameter that has been measured already within a physical context unrelated to 
theory A. Let us now assume that the measured parameter value lies far beyond the range of 
the next generation of experiments E which have been planned in order to test theory A. In 
that case, we know that theory B, while relevant for our understanding of global 
underdetermination, remains irrelevant for local underdetermination: theory B does not 
constitute an alternative theory that, according to our best knowledge, can be 
distinguishable from A by experiments E. 
To give an example for this way of reasoning, let us look at non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics. Quantum field theory constitutes a theoretical alternative to non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics that becomes empirically distinguishable from the latter once processes 
close to the velocity of light enter the picture. Physicists at the time when quantum physics 
was developed knew the speed of light from astronomical measurements which had no 
connection to quantum physics. That knowledge fixed the scale where non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics and quantum field theory became distinguishable and, on that basis, 
created a regime where quantum field theory was known not to constitute an empirically 
distinguishable alternative to quantum mechanics. Therefore, quantum field theory left local 
limitations to underdetermination within that regime untouched and only contributed to 
global underdetermination.  
 Having established the nature of the distinction between local and global 
underdetermination in fundamental physics, we now come to the crucial point of our 
analysis. As we will show, the final theory arguments presented above can be understood as 
arguments which block the distinction between local and global underdetermination. To 
understand this, let us put the relevant limit for local underdetermination at the 
characteristic scale of our theory where the theory’s core predictions can be tested. (In the 
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case of string theory, it would obviously make no sense to discuss local underdetermination 
with respect to the next generation of collider experiments which most likely are incapable 
of testing the theory.) Now, let us first look at the case of a fundamental theory that is fully 
universal in the sense that it covers all information on parameter values which determine 
the size of known phenomena. In this case, no external theory is available anymore that 
could fix a parameter value that controls the extent to which our theory and a possible 
alternative theory are empirically distinguishable.  The kind of reasoning sketched in the 
previous paragraphs therefore breaks down.  
This step already significantly reduces the options for alternative theories which do 
not affect local limitations to scientific underdetermination. It does not fully eradicate them, 
however. We could still face situations where a certain constellation within the present 
theory constrains alternative theories to regimes which remain inaccessible to those 
experiments which test the present theory’s core predictions. An example for such a 
constellation would be the relation between the standard model and grand unified theories. 
Grand unified theories are compatible with present empirical data only if unification occurs 
at the scale where the known gauge couplings (which have been measured close to the 
electroweak scale and can be calculated for higher energy scales based on renormalization 
group techniques) all assume the same value. This scale, called the GUT scale, is known to lie 
far beyond the grasp of collider experiments, however (if we want to disregard the 
possibility of large extra dimensions for the moment). On that basis, we can know that grand 
unified theories cannot be distinguished from the standard model in collider experiments 
which test energy scales far below the GUT scale. Grand unified theories thus constitute 
alternatives which affect global underdetermination but most probably are of no concern to 
local underdetermination immediately above the electroweak scale. 
Constellations of the kind described in the last paragraph, however, are excluded by 
the second final theory argument, the argument for a minimal length scale based on duality. 
Once such a minimal scale is established within a universal theory at that theory’s 
characteristic scale, there is no way to make sense of the statement that this theory remains 
viable beyond its characteristic scale but stops being viable far beyond that scale. Expressed 
in terms of energy scale, any new theory that is distinguishable from the old theory at all 
thus must be distinguishable already one step beyond the scale where the old theory’s core 
predictions are empirically tested. In other words, if one would find an alternative theory 
that contributed to global scientific underdetermination it necessarily would have to 
contribute to local underdetermination as well.12  
 Both final theory claims presented in the context of string theory in this light may be 
understood in a new way. On their own, the arguments cannot establish that theory 
succession which goes beyond string theory is unlikely. They do establish, however, that 
arguments which suggest limitations to local scientific underdetermination must be 
acknowledged as arguments against unlimited global scientific underdetermination as well. 
                                                          
12
 Note that the concepts of local and global underdetermination have been defined with respect to the energy 
scale, which, as discussed above, defines the range of experimental testing in high energy physics. Other 
parameters could control a theory’s empirical testability as well, though. Examples would be the number of 
events or the time scale of empirical testing. Those parameters may be theoretically related to the theory’s 
characteristic energy scale. (A good example is proton decay, where the phenomenon’s observation depends 
on the number of protons observed but the theoretical framework relates proton decay to new physics at 
some high energy scale.) If no such theory-based correlation with energy scales exists, however, new physics 
might arise without having any characteristic energy scale. The presented argument does not exclude or render 
less likely new physics of that kind. An assessment of the likelihood of such scenarios must be based on 
different considerations.    
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The arguments thus play the role of mediators which connect the local and the global level 
of analysis and thereby raise the significance of local arguments. 
Once the local limitations to scientific underdetermination in contemporary high 
energy physics have been shown to translate into global limitations, the viability of internal 
final theory claims can be related to empirical data via the meta-inductive argument and 
thereby can attain a certain degree of trust.  
Acknowledging that final theory arguments can indeed be meaningful, it is important 
to specify the implications a trustworthy final theory claim can have in the context of 
contemporary string physics. Given the actual situation in string physics, such a claim clearly 
does not suggest anything like an imminent completion of theory building in fundamental 
physics. Rather, it seems to suggest a shift of the overall dynamics of the research process. 
The classical picture of scientific progress was based on the concept of an infinite sequence 
of scientific theories which attained a largely complete form within a limited period of time 
and could be tested empirically afterwards. The emerging new picture does not alter the 
infinite time horizon for the completion of physics. However, that infinite time horizon is 
now being identified with the time horizon for the completion of the one fully universal 
theory physicists are working on. In the old framework, we could not expect that our limited 
theories could ever cover the whole range of all empirical data that could ever be collected. 
In the newly emerging framework, the universal theory, call it string theory, can neither be 
expected to find a complete form nor conclusive empirical testing in the foreseeable future.   
  
 
5: Conclusion 
 
The previous sections have demonstrated that assessments of limitations to scientific 
underdetermination are of crucial importance at two different levels in string physics. They 
are essential for non-empirical assessments of a theory’s viability: without establishing local 
limitations to scientific underdetermination, string physicists would have to treat their 
theory as a mere speculation and could not find any rational reasons for having any trust in 
its viability. Furthermore, assessments of limitations to scientific underdetermination also 
provide arguments for the theory’s final theory status. Final theory claims amount to 
extending the local claims of limitations to scientific underdetermination to a global level.  
As we have seen, the local and the global level of analysing scientific 
underdetermination show a complex pattern of mutual interdependence. Several layers of 
argumentation are built on top of each other. The basis for all other arguments of limitations 
to scientific underdetermination is provided by a use of empirical confirmation of scientific 
theories at a meta-level. The predictive success of scientific theories in the research field 
constitutes a necessary precondition for the viability of any other argument on scientific 
underdetermination by establishing the connection between entirely theoretical 
assessments and the performance of theories in an empirical context. Once this connection 
has been established, other purely theoretical arguments can be deployed to strengthen the 
case for local limitations to scientific underdetermination and thereby enhance the trust in a 
physical theory even in the absence of sufficient empirical confirmation. Eventually, global 
arguments on limitations to scientific underdetermination can be supported by the empirical 
basis as well. This last step works with regard to fully universal theories where local 
arguments of limitations to scientific underdetermination turn out to be relevant for the 
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question of global scientific underdetermination. On that basis, final theory claims may be 
turned into genuinely scientific statements.  
The suggested mechanism constitutes a significant modification of the canonical 
paradigm of theory assessment. The assessment of scientific underdetermination is being 
acknowledged as a possible basis for the acquisition of scientific knowledge even in the 
absence of confirming empirical evidence for the corresponding theory. We have pointed 
out that the current developments in fundamental physics offer two good reasons for 
acknowledging assessments of limitations to scientific underdetermination as legitimate 
strategies of scientific theory evaluation. First, the increasing difficulties to obtain conclusive 
empirical confirmation may be taken to suggest that fundamental physics is must resort to 
these strategies in order to remain a sound and dynamical scientific field. Second, our 
analysis has provided strong indications that the new strategies of theory assessment can 
indeed be justified. They are conceptually related to and based on the principle of empirical 
testing and therefore do not constitute arbitrary criteria of scientific success.  
In order to acknowledge the deployment of the new strategies as a critical method of 
theory assessment, it is important to consider one more question, though: Is it possible to 
construe scenarios of non-empirical evidence which would weaken or destroy trust in these 
strategies in a given context and consequently reduce trust in the theories supported by 
them? Indeed, such scenarios can be found for all presented arguments of non-empirical 
theory assessment. (For a slightly more extensive analysis of this point see [Dawid 2009].)  
The argument of no alternatives relies on the observation that no conceptually 
equally satisfactory alternatives to string theory are found. It would have to be withdrawn 
whenever a conceptually satisfactory alternative to string theory was in fact discovered. Any 
such alternative would thus significantly reduce the trust in string theory.  The argument of 
unexpected explanatory interconnections would lose strength if some of the 
interconnections in question turned out to be based on more general patterns of reasoning 
which are not univocally related to string theory.13 On a more general basis, theoretical 
arguments in favour of string theory could also be weakened by other developments which 
would cast doubt on the research program’s chances of success. For example, an improved 
theoretical understanding of string physics might reveal theoretical weaknesses which 
change the theoretical assessment of the theory’s chances of being fully consistent and thus 
physically viable. Furthermore, an interruption of theoretical progress over a long period of 
time could raise doubts whether a more complete theoretical understanding of string 
physics was attainable at all. 
The meta-inductive argument from other theories’ predictive successes, finally, can 
lose power based on new empirical data regarding other theories. Trust in string theory 
could be substantially reduced if theories which seemed to have no alternatives turned out 
to make false predictions. To give an example, let us assume for a moment that no Higgs 
particle was found at the ongoing LHC experiments at CERN. Many observers would then 
raise the question how confident one could be regarding the remote claims of string theory 
if one could not even predict the existence the Higgs particle correctly. 
Regarding final theory claims of string physics, any argument that would weaken the 
status of string theory itself would weaken the related final theory claim as well.  
                                                          
13
 In fact, considerations along these lines are being discussed and contribute to a better understanding of the 
significance of the argument of unexpected explanatory interconnections. For example, it has been argued that 
microscopic calculations of black hole entropy can be calculated based on general principles without using a 
string theoretical framework  (see [Strominger 1998], [Carlip 2008]). 
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String theory thus could well fail according to non-empirical theory assessment even 
in the absence of empirical refutation. Non-empirical theory assessment therefore can be 
called a critical method of theory evaluation. At a meta-level, the non-empirical strategies of 
theory assessment are themselves strengthened or weakened based on comparing theory 
assessments on their basis with later results of empirical testing. Any instance where a 
theory’s endorsement based on non-empirical theory assessment is later vindicated by 
empirical testing strengthens the principle of non-empirical theory assessment; any instance 
where such an endorsement must be withdrawn due to empirical testing or new theoretical 
analysis weakens it. The future relevance of the discussed strategies of non-empirical theory 
assessment therefore will strongly depend on the future scientific evolution.  
The fact that the reliability of the method of non-empirical theory assessment can 
itself be empirically tested provides a basis for taking seriously judgements like the final 
theory claim, which cannot be confirmed empirically themselves but can be made plausible 
by being integrated into an empirically testable context.  
Non-empirical theory assessment thus crucially relies on empirical testing and can 
never fully replace it. Nor does non-empirical theory assessment award the same status to a 
theory as strong empirical confirmation. It is vaguer and less conclusive than the testing of 
theories by empirical data. Its vagueness induces the risk that its deployment might be 
overstretched and thereby lose its cogent connection to the principle of empirical testing. 
The constant surveillance of strategies of non-empirical theory assessment thus seems of 
high importance.  
If handled with care, however, these strategies can play an independent role in 
contexts where empirical testing is absent or insufficient for a long period of time. They may 
also reach beyond the limits of what can be empirically tested in principle to the extent the 
method of reasoning remains empirically testable. Non-empirical theory assessment breaks 
new ground in replacing the old dichotomy between empirical confirmation and mere 
speculation by a continuum of degrees of credibility, where the available elements of 
empirical corroboration and non-empirical theory assessment jointly contribute to an overall 
evaluation of theory’s chances of being viable. 
The present paper has been concerned with the role of assessments of scientific 
underdetermination in string physics. It is important to point out, however, that string 
physics merely constitutes a particularly strong example of a broader development. It has 
been mentioned above that theories like supersymmetry and grand unified theories have 
been developed without direct empirical confirmation for several decades just like string 
theory. Their chances of being viable have been assessed based on the very same local non-
empirical arguments which are being deployed in the context of string physics. Empirical 
cosmology enters a phase where theory building becomes more specific and empirical data 
is getting more powerful, so that some degree of empirical testing can be established. Still, 
those empirical tests mostly are not strong enough for providing conclusive verdicts on 
specific cosmological theories. Assessments of scientific underdetermination in that case are 
joined with empirical data and assume an important role for an overall assessment of the 
theories’ viability.  
Many physicists may wish back the golden old days of physics when fundamental 
theories could (more often than not) be tested empirically within a reasonable period of 
time and a clear-cut empirical verdict in due time rendered irrelevant all tedious theoretical 
considerations concerning a theory’s viability. Empirical science, however, must answer to 
the situation it actually faces and make the best of it. A sober look at the current situation in 
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fundamental physics suggests that the old paradigm of theory assessment has lost much of 
its power and new strategies are already stepping in.   
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